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Potential answer readings expected, missing
Deniz Özyıldız∗
Abstract. In Turkish, some attitude reports alternate in veridicality with embedded
declaratives. These, however, are uniformly veridical with embedded questions, but
given a generalization due to Spector and Egré (2015), we expect them to alternate
there as well. I present this puzzle of the missing potential answer reading and argue
that two known restrictions on the distribution of embedded questions do not account
for it, namely one based on non-veridicality simpliciter, and the other, on neg-raising.
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1. Introduction. A reading that we reasonably expect sentence (1) to have is missing. I argue that
this is the case, explore (and set aside) two hypotheses as to why, and spell out the consequences
for our understanding of embedded clauses—questions in particular. In (1), the Turkish attitude
predicate bil- embeds a polar question. Like its translation, the sentence ascribes to the attitude
holder a belief, which is the true answer to the question.
(1) Su
Su
[Ay-ın
Ay-gen
parti-ye
party-dat
gid-ip
go-conj
git-me-diğ-in-i]
go-neg-nmz-3s.poss-acc
bil-iyor.
bil-pres.3s
Su knows whether Ay went to the party. (#But she’s wrong.)
In example (1), bil- and know are veridical with interrogatives (read, for now, involving true belief).
The reading that (1) is expected to have, but does not, is non-veridical. It is paraphrased as “Su has
a belief about whether Ay went to the party,” one that need not be true. This is the potential answer
reading, and the observation that it’s missing, the puzzle of the missing potential answer reading.
It is rather unsurprising that the English sentence has veridical truth conditions. After all, we
learn that know introduces a relation that only holds between individuals and true propositions.
That is, know is also veridical with respect to declaratives. One may doubt this in different ways,
e.g., Hazlett (2010), but it is particularly clear that the Turkish predicate bil- does not necessarily
require the truth of, i.e., it is not necessarily veridical with, the declaratives that it composes with
(Özyıldız, 2017a). This difference is illustrated—schematically for Turkish until Section 3—in (2).
(2) Su #knows/Xbils that Ay went to the party. . . But she’s wrong.
In addition to this observation about bil-, a generalization by Spector and Egré (2015) states that a
predicate is veridical with respect to interrogative complements if and only if it is veridical with
respect to declarative complements. The veridical case was seen with know. Example (3) illustrates
the non-veridical case with agree. (Potential counter-examples are discussed in due time.)
(3) Su and Öz agree that/on whether Ay went to the party. . . But they’re wrong.
The availability of non-veridical truth conditions for bil- reports and Spector and Egré’s general-
ization, lead us to expect examples like (1) to have a non-veridical reading, contrary to fact.
Why is this reading missing? It is too strong to assume that veridicality is contributed by
the embedded question, in light of (3) (Karttunen, 1977). Two potential answers are found in the
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literature on the distribution of embedded questions. One, predicates like believe or think resist
question embedding, as in (4a). As it turns out, there are ways of getting believe and think to
embed questions, but I will not focus on this here (Roberts, 2019; Dayal, 2017; White, 2019). Two,
predicates like be certain only seem to embed questions when negated, as in (4b).
(4) a. *Su believes/thinks whether Ay went to the party.
b. Su *is/isn’t certain whether it’s raining.
Theiler et al. (2017, 2019) and Mayr (2018) argue that some attitude reports have semantic
properties—being neg(ative)-raising, for (4a), being non-veridical simpliciter, for (4b)—that some-
times result in deviance when combined with the semantics of questions. Here I explore the hy-
pothesis that these properties might be the reason that the missing reading is missing. Finding,
however, that the behavior of attitude reports introduced by predicates like bil- differ from ones that
are neg-raising or non-veridical simpliciter, I conclude that we need an alternative explanation.
2. Background on Turkish embedded clauses. I focus on two ways of embedding clauses. The
examples in (5) illustrate with declaratives and düşün-, ‘think,’ (düşün- patterns differently from bil-
but it straightforwardly provides a fuller paradigm). Example (5a) involves a nominalized embedded
clause with a genitive subject, and with nominalizing morphology, possessive agreement and case
on the verb. Example (5b) involves a clause that looks like a root clause introduced by themorpheme
diye, which derives from the verb de-, ‘say.’ These two reports happen to be synonymous.
(5) a. Su
Su
[Ay-ın
Ay-gen
parti-ye
party-dat
git-tigˇ-in-i]
go-nmz-3s.poss-acc
düşün-üyor.
think-pres.3s
b. Su
Su
[Ay
Ay
parti-ye
party-dat
git-ti
go-pst.3s
diye]
diye
düşün-üyor.
think-pres.3s
Su thinks that Ay went to the party.
These two embedding strategies also introduce questions. Note that düşün- is compatible with
questions, not an uncommon option for ‘think’-like verbs cross-linguistically, but more restricted in
English (Rajesh Bhatt, p.c., Dayal, 2017, Roberts, 2018, White, 2019). The synonymous examples
in (6) involve polar questions, which I use throughout to sidestep issues about exhaustiveness.
Nominalized polar questions require reduplicating the embedded predicate. This is possible but
not obligatory with diye questions.1 These require expressing the polar question marker mI.
(6) a. Su
Su
[Ay-ın
Ay-gen
parti-ye
party-dat
gid-ip
go-coord
git-me-digˇ-in-i]
go-neg-nmz-3s.poss-acc
düşün-üyor.
think-pres.3s
b. Su
Su
[Ay
Ay
partiye
party-dat
git-ti
go-pst.3s
mi
Q
diye]
diye
düşün-üyor
think-pres.3s
Su is thinking (about) whether Ay went to the party.
3. Veridicality alternates with declaratives. With predicates like düşün-, the choice between a
nominalization and a diye clause does not make any difference in terms of veridicality. (An attitude
report is veridical iff it entails the embedded proposition.) Both examples in (5) are non-veridical.
However, with some predicates including bil- and hatırla-, this choice does make a difference:
1Elsewhere, the morpheme -(y)Ip conjoins verbs. It would rather be analyzed as disjunction in embedded questions.
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(7) a. Su
Su
[Ay-nin
Ay-gen
parti-ye
party-dat
git-tigˇ-in-i]
go-nmz-3s.poss-acc
bil-iyor/hatırl-ıyor.
know-pres.3s/remember-pres.3s
Su knows/remembers that Ay went to the party.
b. Su
Su
[Ay
Ay
parti-ye
party-dat
git-ti
go-pst.3s
diye]
diye
bil-iyor/hatırl-ıyor.
know-pres.3s/remember-pres.3s
Su has the belief/recollection that Dilara was at the party.
Sentence (7a), with a nominalization, has a veridical (in fact, a factive) understanding. (That
is, the sentence presupposes the embedded proposition aside from or in addition to entailing it.)
Sentence (7b), with a diye clause, is non-veridical: It neither presupposes nor entails the embedded
proposition. I have studied this phenomenon elsewhere under the name of the factivity alternation
(Özyıldız, 2016, 2017a,b), but I prefer the terms veridicality alternation here. Truth entailments
apply to declaratives and questions, but I do not know whether presupposition has any role to play
regarding the present facts. (It might turn out to be otherwise. See Saebø (2007) and Guerzoni and
Sharvit (2007) who do make use of factivity in the realm of embedded questions.)
In Turkish, the veridicality alternation is conditioned by at least two factors on top of attitude
predicate choice. The first factor, which applies to attitude reports with nominalized clauses, is the
position of main sentential prominence (Yagˇmur Sagˇ, p.c., tells me that there might be variation
here). As in (8), prominence on thematrix predicate brings out the veridical understanding (denying
the embedded proposition feels contradictory), and prominence on embedded material, the non-
veridical one (the denial is consistent). I show elsewhere that the veridical alternant is also factive
(Özyıldız, 2017a), but veridicality suffices for present purposes.2
(8) Su
Su
Su
[Ay’ın
[Ay’ın
Ay
partiye
partiye
party
gittigˇini]
GİTTİGˇİNİ]
go.nmz
BİLİYOR/HATIRLIYOR
biliyor/hatırlıyor
know/remember
#ama
Xama
but
gitmedi.
gitmedi.
she didn’t go
a. Su knows/remembers that Ay went to the party #but she didn’t go. (matrix)
b. Su thinks/has the memory that Ay went to the party Xbut she didn’t go. (embedded)
The second factor is using a diye clause. Diye clauses necessarily give rise to a non-veridical
interpretation, regardless of the position of main sentential prominence. This is illustrated in (9),
where the continuation denying the embedded proposition is consistent in both cases.
(9) Su
Su
Su
[Ay
[Ay
Ay
partiye
partiye
party
gitti
GİTTİ
went
diye]
diye]
diye
BİLİYOR/HATIRLIYOR
biliyor/hatırlıyor
know/remember
Xama
Xama
but
gitmedi.
gitmedi.
she didn’t go
Su has the belief/recollection that Ay went to the party Xbut she didn’t go.
Such alternations are explored in a number of languages (Moulton (2009); Bondarenko (2018);
Djärv (2017), a.o.). But, does veridicality also alternate with embedded questions?
4. Interrogative veridicality and Spector and Egré’s generalization. (Non-)veridicality also
describes some attitude reports with embedded questions, e.g., under know and agree in (10).
These sentences entail that the attitude holders believe an answer to the question, i.e., that Ay was
2The suggestion that the pre-continuation strings in (8) are ambiguous between veridical and non-veridical might be
confounded depending on how prosody is taken to play a role here. Veridical truth conditions entail non-veridical ones
and only postulating the latter suffices (Reinhart, 1976; Ruys, 2001, Katerina Vostrikova, p.c.). This worry pops up
again with (non-)veridicality with questions, but should not affect my main point.
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at the party or that not. (Because these are belief predicates, the relation between the attitude holder
and the answer is belief. With other predicates the relation is different, e.g., tell.) But, know and
agree differ in that know entails that that belief is true, agree does not: The continuation in (10) is
contradictory after know, but consistent with agree. I assume the preposition on to be semantically
vacuous (Elliott, 2017 cf. Rawlins, 2013; Égré, 2008; Mayr, 2018).
(10) Su and Öz #know/Xagree on whether Ay was at the party. . . But they’re wrong.
Attitude reports that entail that the attitude holder is related to the true answer to an embedded
question are veridical, and those that do not are non-veridical. The latter relate an individual to
potential answers to the question. Some, e.g., Mayr (2018), distinguish between d(eclarative)- and
i(nterrogative)-veridicality. I use these terms where a confusion between the two might arise.
Spector and Egré (2015) propose that i-veridicality and d-veridicality are correlated. This
is only possible for responsive predicates, ones compatible with declaratives and questions alike
(know, agree, etc.). This class is opposed to the rogatives, which only embed questions (wonder),
and to the anti-rogatives, only declaratives (believe).3 Their generalization goes as follows:
[A] responsive predicate is veridical with respect to its interrogative complement (like
know + question = knowing the true answer to the question) if and only if it is veridical
with respect to its declarative complements as well (know + declarative entails—in fact
presupposes—that the declarative is true). (Spector and Egré, 2015, p. 1732)
Both know and agree are well-behaved with respect to this generalization. The former is both
declarative- and interrogative-veridical, the latter is neither.
One famous counter-example to the ‘if interrogative-veridical, then declarative-veridical’ di-
rection of the implication is tell. It appears to be non-veridical with declaratives, but veridical with
questions, as in (11) (Karttunen (1977), cf. Tsohatzidis (1993, 1997); Holton (1997)).
(11) Su told ÖzXthat/#whether Ay was at the party. . . But she lied.
A recent counter-example to the ‘if declarative-veridical, then interrogative-veridical’ direction are
predicates of relevance like care and matter (Elliott et al., 2017). I leave these aside here.4
5. The missing potential answer reading. From the observation that veridicality alternates with
declaratives and the assumption that Spector and Egré’s generalization holds, the expectation arises
that veridicality should also alternate with embedded questions. But this expectation is not satisfied.
Attitude predicates that alternate in declarative veridicality also embed questions, as in (12).
When they do, the attitude reports entail that the attitude holder believes an answer to the embedded
question, unlike, e.g., wonder or ask. This suggests that these predicates are responsive, and that
they are covered by Spector and Egré’s generalization.
(12) a. Su
Su
[Ay’ın
Ay
partiye
party
gid-ip
go-coord
git-me-digˇ-in-i]
go-neg-nmz-3s.poss-acc
biliyor/hatırlıyor.
know/remember
Su knows/remembers whether Ay went to the party.
b. Su
Su
[kimin
who
partiye
party
git-tigˇ-in-i]
go-nmz-3s.poss-acc
biliyor/hatırlıyor.
know/remember
Su knows/remembers who went to the party.
3Estonian mõtlema (Roberts, 2018), düşün- (exx. (5)/(6)), and think (White, 2019), take declaratives and questions.
But with questions, they entail that their subject is agnostic. Such predicates are ‘hybrid,’ in that the first property is
shared with canonical responsives, the second, with rogatives. Spector & Egré’s generalization would not apply here.
4Many thanks to Lucas Champollion for discussion.
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Furthermore, these attitude reports require that the attitude holder believe the true answer to the
embedded question. They are i-veridical. Evidence is that following up the examples in (12) with
(13a), or asserting them in context (13b) gives rise to a contradiction. Both the continuation and the
context entail that the attitude holders are mistaken in their belief about the answer to the question.
(13) a. [contradictory with (12)]. . .
. . .
ama
but
yanılıyorlar.
they’re mistaken.
b. [contradictory with (12)]Su’yla Öz partiye Ay’ın gittigˇini sanıyor, ama yanılıyorlar.
Su and Öz believe that Ay was at the party, but they’re wrong.
Section 3 showed that the declarative veridicality alternation was conditioned by two factors: The
position of main sentential prominence with nominalized clauses, and the choice of a diye clause.
These manipulations do not affect the veridicality of attitude reports with embedded questions.
Prominence is placed on thematrix verb and on the embedded predicate in (14). Both sentences
are veridical. The tests in (13) give rise to a contradiction. Prominence position makes a difference
in question answer congruence: The first sentence is felicitous out of the blue; The second has
narrow focus on the embedded clause and is an acceptable answer to, e.g., “What does Ay know?”
(14) Su
Su
Su
[Ay’ın
[Ay’ın
Ay
partiye
partiye
party
gidip
gidip
gocoord
gitmedigˇini]
GİTMEDİGˇİNİ]
go.neg.nmz
BİLİYOR.
biliyor.
know
Su knows whether Ay went to the party.
As seen in (15a), diye questions are compatible withmerak et-, ‘wonder,’ sor-, ‘ask,’ or düşün-
‘think.’ Yet, as in (15b), they are ungrammatical with predicates that participate in the veridicality
alternation. While this contrast raises its own puzzles to explore, they cannot be pursued here. It
suffices to note that diye clauses do not give rise to non-veridical readings with questions either.5
(15) a. Su
Su
[Ay
Ay
partiye
party
gitti
went
mi
Q
diye]
diye
{merak ed-iyor,
wonder-pres.3s
sor-du,
ask-pst.3s
düşü-nüyor}.
think-pres.3s
Su wonders/asked/is thinking (about) whether Ay was at the party.
b. *Su
Su
[Ay
Ay
partiye
party
gitti
went
mi
Q
diye]
diye
{bil-iyor,
know-pres.3s
hatırl-ıyor}.
remember-pst.3s
Int. Su knows/remembers whether Ay was at the party.
In sum, predicates that alternate in veridicality with declaratives do not alternate in veridicality
with questions: Only veridical readings are available. The strategies that (descriptively) give rise to
non-veridicality in declarative embedding do not bring out non-veridical readings with questions.6
Some argue that veridicality is contributed by the embedded question itself (Karttunen, 1977).
But just like English agree, Turkish has predicates like hemfikir ol- (‘to be of the same opinion’)
that do not give rise to i-veridical interpretations. Attitude reports where they introduce questions
can be continued by (13a) and they can be asserted in contexts like (13b) without contradiction.
5Diye questions with predicates like bil- or hatırla improve when these are further embedded under ‘want’ or ‘try.’ This
is reminiscent of embedded root phenomena with questions (McCloskey, 2006; Dayal and Grimshaw, 2009).
6The veridicality inference can be suspended with questions by explicitly qualifying the truth of the belief with adverbs
like yanlış, ‘falsely,’ or dogˇru, ‘truly’ (see Baç and Irmak, 2011). This raises questions about the nature of the inference.
This resemblesmis- in, e.g.,misremember, which may take questions with a false belief meaning (Holton, 2017). Here
too, if remember entails truth andmisremember is compositional, why is the predicate not systematically contradictory?
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(16) Su-yla
Su-with
Öz
Öz
[Ay’ın
Ay
partiye
party
gid-ip
go-coord
git-me-digˇ-in-de]
go-neg-nmz-3s.poss-loc
hemfikirler
agree
Su and Öz agree on whether Ay went to the party.
Two worries arise in checking Spector and Egré’s predictions for declarative veridicality
alternating reports. First, the formulation of the generalization assumes that veridicality is a
lexical property of attitude predicates (“[A] responsive predicate is veridical. . . ”). But, veridicality
alternates in the reports we are concerned with, such that it is unclear whether the predicates
involved are lexically to be veridical or not. Both are valid analytical options, provided that one
explains why the inference appears sometimes to be absent in one case, or present in the other.
While the empirical facts remain the same either way, the explanandum changes depending on
our stance on the matter. If one assumes that the attitude predicates are non-veridical, my latest
official stance on the matter (Özyıldız, 2017a, 2018), what is surprising is that the non-veridical
reading is missing with questions. If, on the other hand, one assumes that they are veridical, the
missing reading is not that surprising. What becomes surprising (again) is the possibility of getting
non-veridical readings with declaratives (many thanks to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting
this point). On a programmatic note, the absence of an interrogative veridicality alternation could
be used as an argument against Spector and Egré’s generalization (Lucas Champollion, p.c.), or,
instead, to argue for the lexical factivity of the predicates that participate in the alternation.
This issue can be sidestepped by reformulating the generalization by making reference to
inferences associated with sentences, rather than to lexical properties of attitude predicates that they
contain. Vincent Homer (p.c.) and an anonymous reviewer point out that a precise reformulation
is difficult to give, as we are dealing with embedded declaratives and questions, which are objects
of a different nature: Sentences that contain one may differ from sentences containing the other in
various ways other than the substitution of one object for another. An intuition is provided in (17).
(This still would not capture the behavior of predicates like think, see fn. 3.)
(17) Modified Spector and Egré’s generalization (non-lexicalist reformulation)
An attitude report of the form “Subject Verb Interrogative” is veridical with respect to its
interrogative complement if and only if “Subject Verb Declarative” is veridical with respect
to its declarative complement (all else being equal and the verb, a responsive).
Spector and Egré focus on English predicates that embed that clauses and do not need this version.
But even in English, alternations exist. The meaning of attitude reports, and in particular whether
they are veridical, is in part determined by the syntax of the clause that they embed. I have in mind
alternations like John knows that he took out the trash vs. John knows to take out the trash.
The second worry is homophony. Perhaps Turkish alternating attitude reports do not obey the
generalization because there are two predicates bil-: One, a non-veridical anti-rogative like believe;
The other, a veridical responsive like know. (Every alternating predicate would be so duplicated.)
Now both are well-behaved with respect to the generalization: Non-veridical bil- does not embed
questions, so a non-i-veridical reading is not observed; Veridical bil- behaves as predicted, being
both d- and i-veridical. Even assuming homophony, the puzzle remains, though in another guise:
Why does non-veridical bil- not embed questions? This is what I turn to next.
6. Why the missing reading could be missing. Perhaps attitude reports that could give rise to
potential answer readings happen to be anti-rogative. If so, they should pattern like other such
embeddings and fall under the same explanations of their anti-rogativity.
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One condition for anti-rogativity is thought to be neg-raising. This is a phenomenon where, in
some multiclausal structures, negation is pronounced in a higher clause, but understood in a lower
one (Fillmore, 1963, p. 220). Negated think or believe, in (18a) license the inference indicated by
‘ ,’ where negation scopes below the attitude predicate. In contrast, negated know or say, in (18b),
do not license a parallel inference. Example (18c) shows that neg-raising reports are anti-rogative.
(18) a. Su doesn’t think/believe that it’s raining.  Su thinks/believes that it’s not raining.
b. Su doesn’t know/didn’t tell us that it’s raining. 6 Su knows/told us that it’s raining.
c. Su doesn’t *think/*believe/know/tell us whether it’s raining.
To derive the inference, some propose that neg-raising predicates trigger the excluded middle
presupposition that the attitude holder either believes the embedded proposition or its negation
(Bp ∨ B¬p). Asserting ¬Bp, in (18a), negates the first disjunct. It follows that B¬p (Bartsch, 1973;
Gajewski, 2005). Theiler et al. (2017, 2019) and Mayr (2018) (as forshadowed in Égré, 2008, fn. 3)
derive anti-rogativity from the excluded middle: Omitting technical details and summarizing Mayr
for concreteness, the definedness/truth conditions of believe with a polar question are in (19):
(19) ~Su doesn’t believe that it’s raining
a. is defined only if Su either believes that it’s raining or that it’s not.
b. if defined, is true if and only if Su either believes that it’s raining or that it’s not.
The definedness conditions and the truth conditions are equivalent, which means that whenever
the sentence is defined, it is true. This is a kind of logical triviality that Gajewski (2002; 2009)
proposes we perceive as ungrammaticality. Hence, neg-raising predicates do not embed questions.
A second sufficient condition for anti-rogativity is non-veridicality simpliciter, but only under
negation. Hence, the contrast in (20)with be certain. WhileMayr generalizes the effect to downward
entailing environments, van Gessel et al. (2018) find that only negation might be effective.
(20) Su ??is/isn’t certain whether it’s raining.
Mayr (2018) argues that positive be certain with a polar question has the assertion and the alter-
natives in (21a). And that the assertion is obligatorily exhaustified at the root node. Because both
alternatives entail the assertion, this amounts to conjoining the assertion with the negated alterna-
tives, in (21b). This is a contradiction, of a kind which is again perceived as ungrammaticality.
(21) a. Assertion: Bp ∨ B¬p Alternatives: {Bp,B¬p}
b. Exh(Bp ∨ B¬p, {Bp,B¬p}) = Bp ∨ B¬p ∧ ¬Bp ∧ ¬B¬p = ⊥
Negated be certain has the assertion and alternatives in (22). The alternatives no longer entail the
assertion and exhaustification has no effect. We end up with the, well-formed, original assertion.
(22) Assertion: ¬Bp ∧ ¬B¬p Alternatives: {¬Bp,¬B¬p}
7. Not neg-raising. If neg-raising is the reason behind the missing reading, the inference should be
detectable in attitude reports where veridicality alternating predicates compose with declaratives.
The four tests for neg-raising in this section suggest that this expectation is not borne out: Strict NPI
licensing (Zwarts, 1996; Gajewski, 2005), cyclicity (Fillmore, 1963; Gajewski, 2005), the “Do you
agree?” (Collins and Postal, 2014), and an—I believe—novel denial of unopinionatedness tests.
Strict NPIs like punctual ona kadar, ‘until ten (o’clock),’ are licensed in nominalizations under
negated düşün-, ‘think,’ and iste-, ‘want,’ but ungrammatical under negated söyle-, ‘tell.’ When
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a doxastic embeds a bouletic, negation can be understood in the lowest clause. Strict NPIs are
licensed there with düşün- or iste-, but not with söyle-. This is cyclicity test.7
(23) a. Su
Su
[Ay’ın
Ay
ona kadar
until ten
partiye
party
gittigˇini]
go.nmz
düşünmüyor/*söylemiyor.
think.neg/tell.neg
Su doesn’t think/*tell X that Ay went to the party until ten.
b. Su
Su
[Ay’ın
Ay
ona kadar
until ten
partiye
party
gitmesini]
go.inf
istemiyor.
want.neg
Su doesn’t want Ay to go to the party until ten.
c. Su
Su
[Ay’ın
Ay
[ona kadar
until ten
partiye
party
gitmek]
go
istedigˇini]
want
düşünmüyor/*söylemiyor.
think.neg/tell.neg
Su doesn’t think/*tell X that Ay wants to go to the party until ten.
Any/ever NPIs differ from strict ones: The former can be licensed across clause boundaries, but the
licensing of the latter is local—initial evidence that negation is pronounced high, but is in fact low.
(24) a. Kimse
anyone
partiye
party
git*(me)di.
go.neg
Nobody went to the party.
b. Ay
Ay
partiye
party
ona kadar
until ten
git*(me)di.
go.neg
Ay didn’t go to the party until ten.
c. Su
Su
[kimse-nin
anyone
partiye
party
gittigˇini]
go.nmz
düşün*(m)üyor/söyle*(m)iyor.
think.neg/tell.neg
Su doesn’t think/tell X that anyone was at the party.
“Do you agree?” and denial of unopinionatedness test the felicity of neg-raising reports in
conversation. In (25a), A asserts “Su doesn’t think p,” and then, “Do you agree?” This is understood
as whether B agrees that not p, rather than whether they agree that it is not the case that Su thinks p.
This is why B’s reply in (25b) is felicitous. Replacing ‘think’ with ‘tell’ results in incongruence.
(25) a. A: Su
Su
[Ay’ın
Ay
partiye
party
gittigˇini]
go.nmz
düşünmüyor/#söylemiyor.
think.neg/tell.neg
Sen de katılıyor musun?
do you agree
A: Su doesn’t think that Ay went to the party. Do you agree?
b. B: Evet,
yes
git-me-digˇ-in-e
go-neg-nmz-3.poss-dat
katıl-ıyor-um.
agree-pres-1s
B: Yes, I agree that she didn’t go.
For denial of unopinionatedness, A asserts that the attitude holder is unopinionated as to the truth
of proposition p. B denies A’s assertion using a neg-raising report with the same attitude holder.
(26) a. A: Su’nun
Su
[Ay’ın
Ay
partiye
party
gidip
go.coord
gitmedigˇi]
go.neg.nmz
hakkında
about
bir
a
du¸şünce-si
thought-3s
yok.
neg.exist
A: Su doesn’t have any thoughts on whether Ay was at the party or not.
b. A: Hayır
no
var.
exist
[Ay’ın
Ay
partiye
party
gittigˇini]
go.nmz
düşün-m-üyor.
think-neg-pres.3s
A: Yeah she does. She doesn’t think that Ay was at the party.
7Cyclicity is named the syntactic view that negation moves cyclically out of embedded clauses (Fillmore, 1963; Collins
and Postal, 2014). Neg-raising is not observed with doxastics under bouletics (Horn, 1972; Gajewski, 2005).
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The truth conditions of (26a) are ¬BSp ∧ ¬BS¬p: Su believes neither p or not p. The success of
B’s denial relies on understanding (26b) as BS¬p, with low negation. The weaker ¬BSp would
have resulted in infelicity, as A’s assertion already entails ¬BSp. This is brought out by ‘tell.’
(27) a. Su
Su
[Ay’ın
Ay
partiye
party
gidip
go.coord
gitmedigˇi]
go.neg.nmz
hakkında
about
bişi
something
söylemedi.
tell.neg
Su didn’t say anything about whether Ay was at the party.
b. #Hayır
no
söyledi.
tell
[Ay’ın
Ay
partiye
party
gittigˇini]
go.nmz
söylemedi.
tell.neg
#Yeah she did. She didn’t say that Ay was there.
These tests reveal that nominalizations under düşün- (or that clauses under think) systematically
differ from corresponding structures with söyle-, or tell. This is because the neg-raising inference is
available with the former, but not the latter. In what follows, I apply these tests to the non-veridical
alternants of veridicality alternating reports and find that they behave as if they were not neg-raising.
Attitude reports with diye—one path to non-veridicality—fail these tests across the board,
regardless of whether the predicate is veridicality alternating, or one, like düşün-, that is elsewhere
neg-raising. In (28a), strict NPIs are not licensed inside diye clauses with negated düşün- or bil-.
Cyclicity fails too, in (28b). As a control, in (28c), weak NPIs are licensed in the same environment.
This militates against the possibility that these reports are (in fact) neg-raising, but that diye disrupts
certain NPI licensings. Rather, the pattern follows canonical non-neg-raising constructions.
(28) a. *Su
Su
[Ay
Ay
ona kadar
until ten
partiye
party
gitti
go
diye]
diye
düşünmüyor/bilmiyor.
think.neg/know.neg
Int. Su doesn’t think that Ay has gone to the party until ten.
b. *Su
Su
[Ay
Ay
[ona kadar
until ten
partiye
party
gitmek]
go.inf
istiyor
want
diye]
diye
düşünmüyor/bilmiyor.
think.neg/know.neg
Int. Su doesn’t think that Ay wants to go to the party until ten.
c. Su
Su
[kimse
anyone
partiye
party
gitti
go
diye]
diye
düşünmüyor/bilmiyor.
think.neg/know.neg
Su doesn’t think that anyone was at the party.
Example (29) shows that these reports fail the “Do you agree?” test. B’s answer in (29b) can be
interpreted as an agreement that it is not the case that Su thinks p, but not an agreement that not p.
(29) a. Su [Ay partiye gitti diye] düşünmüyor/bilmiyor. Sen de katılıyor musun?
Int. Su doesn’t think that Ay went to the party. Do you agree?
b. Evet, #gitmedigˇine katılıyorum.
Int. Yes, I agree that she didn’t go.
Finally, (30) shows that diye with negated düşün- or bil- cannot serve to deny unopinionatedness.
(30) a. Su’nun [Ay’ın partiye gidip gitmedigˇi] hakkında bir düşüncesi/bilgisi yok.
Su doesn’t have any thoughts/information on whether Ay went to the party or not.
b. #Hayır var. Gitti diye düşünmüyor/bilmiyor.
Int. No she does. She doesn’t think that she did.
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Why do diye clauses not give rise to neg-raising inference, evenwith düşün-? I do not know, but
there is a lesson here.8 Sections 2–3 had shown that diye questions were compatible with düşün-,
but not bil-. What regulates the distribution of diye questions might then not be neg-raising: Neither
düşün- nor bil- are neg-raising with diye. The former embeds diye questions, the latter does not.
The second test case are non-veridical readings with nominalizations, which persist when the
the main predicate is negated. Two complications arise however. First, intonation is a factor that
(dis)favors non-veridicality in the affirmative. But with negation, intonation patterns change. An
accurate description is impossible here, but observe that the verb is prominent in (31b) as opposed
to embedded material, which would have been expected in the affirmative. The second is brought
out by the attempt to elicit the relevant non-veridical readings. In (31), negated bil- with the
nominalization p answers the question ‘p?’ Given the question, it would be an odd (though not
impossible) discourse move to presuppose p, suggesting that the report is non-factive. However,
it is also an odd move to reply to a direct question by asserting somebody’s ignorance about the
answer. The felicity of the answer suggests, however, that (31b) has a stronger understanding, one
that implies that Su believes not p. Could this be the neg-raising raising inference?
(31) a. Ay partiye gitti mi?
Did Ay go to the party?
b. Su [gittigˇini] BİLmiyor.
Su doesn’t think that she did.
While the existence of this stronger reading seems undeniable, its source might be conversa-
tional.9 Importantly attitude reports of the form in (31) do not pass our four neg-raising tests. In
(32), strict NPIs are not licensed in nominalizations under bil-, but weak NPIs are, and the reports
fail cyclicity.10
(32) a. *Su [Ay’ın ona kadar partiye gittigˇini] bilmiyor.
Int. Su doesn’t think that Ay has been to the party until ten.
b. Su [kimsenin partiye gittigˇini] bilmiyor.
Su doesn’t think that anybody went to the party.
c. *Su [Ay’ın [ona kadar partiye gitmek] istedigˇini] bilmiyor.
Int. Su doesn’t think that Ay wants to go to the party until ten.
Example (33) suggests that they fail the “Do you agree?” test, and (34), denial of opinionatedness.
(33) a. Su [Ay’ın partiye gittigˇini] bilmiyor. Sen de katılıyor musun?
Int. Su doesn’t think that Ay went to the party. Do you agree?
b. Evet, #gitmedigˇine katılıyorum.
Int. Yes, I agree that she didn’t go.
8Clause type, mood, or aspectual properties of the matrix verb affect neg-raising (Prince, 1976; Bervoets, 2014).
9Ex. (31b) has two possible LFs: the negated non-veridical ¬Bp and the negated veridical ¬(p ∧ Bp). In saying that
negated bil- with a nominalization is non-veridical, I am suggesting that the sentence has the former LF. But, in fact,
there is a confound here: ¬Bp entails ¬(p ∧ Bp) so we cannot tell whether (31) is the negation of a non-veridical
attitude (strong), or the negation of a veridical one (weak). Important for present purposes is that (31) is not necessarily
factive. I do not recall the references but English I don’t know that also gives rise to unexpected stronger readings.
10Lee and Hong (2016) suggest that in Korean, which is also reported to have a veridicality alternation, non-veridical
alternants are neg-raising. WooJin Chung (p.c.) reports that they might pass some of the tests for neg-raising-hood
used in this section, though that the intuitions might ultimately be unclear.
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(34) a. Su’nun [Ay’ın partiye gidip gitmedigˇi] hakkında bir düşüncesi/bilgisi yok.
Su doesn’t have any thought/information on whether Ay went to the party or not.
b. #Hayır var. Gittigˇini bilmiyor.
Int. Yes she does. She doesn’t think that she did.
To sum up, non-veridical alternants of veridicality alternating reports do not pattern like they are
neg-raising and it is then reasonable to think that they are not. As a result, we cannot say that the
missing embedded question reading is missing because the non-veridical alternants are neg-raising.
8. Not non-veridicality simpliciter. If non-veridicality simpliciter is behind the missing reading,
alternating attitude reports should behave like other non-veridical reports in question embedding.
The canonical case for the latter is be certain. But tell sets up a more accurate comparison because
it is a predicate that is puzzling in much the same ways as bil-. Know will serve as the veridical
control. While there is much to untangle, it will appear that bil- rather patterns like know.
Four cases are relevant for tell: veridical or not, with declaratives and questions. Tell is naturally
non-veridical with declaratives, the denials in (35a) being consistent. Factive readings are argued to
exist, in (35b) where “Hey wait a minute!” tests for presupposition (von Fintel, 2004). The natural
reading with questions is veridical (Karttunen, 1977), the denial in (35c) being contradictory.
Non-veridical readings are argued to exist, in (35d), where the denial is consistent (cf. know).
(35) a. Su told Öz that Ay was at the party. . . Xbut she lied/Xbut Dilara wasn’t there.
b. A: Sue told Jack that Fred is the culprit. (Spector and Egré, 2015, ex. 34)
B:XHey wait a minute! I didn’t know that Fred is the culprit.
c. Su told Öz whether Ay was at the party. . . #but she lied.
d. Every day the meteorologists Xtell us/#know where it will rain the following day, but
they are often wrong. (Spector and Egré, 2015, exx. 20–21)
The factive and non-veridical uses of tell are likely derived, but authors assume for simplicity that
the predicate is ambiguous between factive and non-veridical variants, tellF and tellNV (Spector
and Egré, 2015; Theiler, 2014; Uegaki, 2015; Mayr, 2018). I follow suit and, for the sake of
compararison, also assume that bil- is ambiguous too between factive bil-F and non-veridical bil-NV.
Mayr (2018) predicts that question embedding with tellNV is polarity sensitive like with be
certain, possible only under negation. This prediction extends to bil-NV too. Before going further,
expectations about the truth conditions of negated (non-)veridical question embedders need to be
spelled out. Assume the translation of a negated be certain+Q report to be of the form in (36).
(36) Su isn’t certain whether p ¬Bp ∧ ¬B¬p
This predicts that negated non-veridical reports should be judged true in a context where the attitude
holder is agnostic as to the answer to the question. They should be judged false, however, in contexts
where the attitude holder has a false belief. Indeed, p ∧ B¬p is inconsistent with ¬Bp ∧ ¬B¬p.
Assume the translation of a negated know+Q report to be of the form in (37). This requires Su
to not have a true belief about the answer. Then, a negated veridical report should be true in both
agnostic and false belief contexts (in neither does she have a true belief).
(37) Su doesn’t know whether p ¬(p ∧ Bp) ∨ ¬(¬p ∧ B¬p)
The predictions for tell depend on whether tellF or tellNV was used, and are spelled out in (38).
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(38) Verifying contexts for “Ay didn’t tell us whether p” if
a. tell=tellnon-veridical: Ay neither says p, nor not p [cf. be certain]
b. tell=tellfactive: Ay neither says p, nor not p or Ay says p but lies [cf. know]
Two confounds are lurking. First, in a false report (cf. belief) context, X didn’t tell Y whether p is
true because tellF is available. But in a no report context, both tellF and tellNV lead to truth. So we
cannot decide which was used. Negation, then, creates a confound that apparently keeps us from
observing the non-veridical reading. Luckily, the facts are in our favor. The natural reading of
negated tell, in (39b), is that Su neither said that Ay was at the party, nor that she was not. Moreover,
this sentence is judged false in context (39a), which sets up a false report situation. This judgment
is accompanied by the intuition that the sentence is false precisely because Su did say something.
(39) a. Context: Su says to us “Ay was at the party,” but she lies. [falsifies ex. (39b)]
b. Su didn’t tell us whether Ay was at the party.
That this context falsifies the sentence suggests that veridical tellF is, for some reason, blocked
under negation. I refer the reader to Mayr (2018) for an account.
When negated, bil-’s non-veridical alternant is judged false or odd in false belief contexts, in
(40a), but felicitous and true in agnostic contexts, in (40b). This pattern resembles precisely what
we expect if bil- is ambiguous like tell, with bil-NV available, and bil-F blocked under negation.
(40) a. # [false belief context]Context: Ay Su’ya yalan söyleyip gitmedim dedigˇi için, . . .
Because Su lied to Ay and told her that she didn’t go, . . .
b. [no belief context]Context: Ay Su’le konusmadıgˇı için, . . .
Because Ay didn’t talk to Su, . . .
c. Su
Su
Ay’ın
Ay
partiye
party
gidip
go.coord
gitmedigˇini
go.neg.nmz
bilmiyor.
know.neg
Su doesn’t know whether Ay went to the party.
But a second confound keeps us from reaching this conclusion. Predicates like know, which
we have no (!) reason to suspect should give rise to non-veridical truth conditions, are also reported
deviant in false belief contexts, as shown in (41) (Paillé and Schwarz, 2018).11
(41)#Given that he lied to her about the outcome of his citizenship application, Aisha doesn’t know
whether Ben is Canadian. (Paillé and Schwarz, 2018, ex. 9a)
At first sight, then, we cannot decide between the hypotheses in (42). (It could also be that tell and
know are out in false belief contexts for a same reason that has nothing to do with veridicality.)
(42) bil- is judged false in false belief contexts and true in no belief contexts because. . .
a. it patterns like be certain and tell in having a potential answer reading.
b. it patterns like know and the pattern is due to independent reasons.
It does seem possible to tease these hypotheses apart, however, and argue that bil- patterns like
know rather than tell. First, our judgment for tell in false report contexts is that it is false. Our
judgment for know in false belief contexts is that the report is odd. Finer grained fieldwork is in
order here, but the initial intuition with bil- is that (40c) is odd, rather than false. This is the first
observation that suggests that negated bil- patterns like know rather than tell. Second, there might
11Thanks to Bernhard Schwarz (p.c.) for clarification about the extent to which the authors think this effect is pervasive.
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be contexts or environments where Paillé and Schwarz’s confound can be alleviated. Certain wh-
questions pattern differently from polar questions in whether they give rise to the inference that the
attitude holder is agnostic. In examples (43a) and (43b), I compare ‘how many’ and ‘who (pl.)’
questions under bil- and söyle in false belief contexts.12 In both pairs of examples, the judgment is
that the tell report is false or odd. The know report, on the other hand, is felicitous and true.
(43) a. Context: Gözlerimin önünde, Ay Su’ya yalan söyler ve tek bir kardeşim var der. . .
Right in front of me, Ay lies to Su and tells her that she only has one sibling. . .
[Kaç
how many
kardeşi
sibling.3s.poss
oldugˇunu]
be.nmz
söylemedi
tell.neg.3s
sana
you.dat
/ bilmiyorsun.
know.neg.2s
She didn’t tell you/You don’t know how many siblings she has.
b. Context: Gözlerimin önünde, Ay Su’ya yalan söyler ve sadece Ceren’le Mercan’la
buluştugˇunu söyler. Oysaki o gün, tam on farklı kişiyle buluştugˇunu biliyorum.
Right in front of me, Ay lies to Su and tells her that she only met with Ceren and Mercan.
But, I know that she met with ten different people that day.
[Kim-ler-le
who-pl-with
buluştugˇunu]
meet.nmz
söylemedi
say.neg.3s
sana
you.dat
/ bilmiyorsun.
know.neg.3s
She didn’t tell you/you don’t know who she met with.
A final difference is that the same contrast between tell and know in the meteorologists frame
replicates in Turkish. This is unexpected if bil- were patterning like söyle-.
(44) Her
every
gün
day
meteorologlar
meteorologists
[ertesi
next
gün
day
nereye
where
yagˇmur
rain
yagˇacagˇını]
precipitate.nmz
söylüyorlar
tell
bize
us
/
#biliyorlar.
know
Ama
but
sık sık
often
yanılıyorlar.
are mistaken
Every day the meteorologists tell us where it will rain the next day but they are often mistaken.
The discussion in this section raises more questions, perhaps, than it answers. Non-veridical
alternants of veridicality alternating attitude reports do not, however, pattern like tell, our benchmark
for non-veridical question embedding. They pattern like English know, veridical with declaratives
and with questions. Non-veridicality simpliciter, then, does not explain the missing reading either.
9. Concluding remarks. I have tried to show that some Turkish predicates alternate in veridicality
with declaratives, but that they do not with questions, only giving rise to veridical readings. And
that two proposals as to what makes predicates unable to embed questions, namely neg-raising and
non-veridicality simpliciter, are likely not responsible for the missing reading.
So what might account for it? It is possible that (non-)question embedders have characteristic
properties that we are overlooking. A starting point that comes to my mind is a weaker notion
of veridicality relativized to attitude holders, rather than speakers (Giannakidou, 1998) (thanks to
Omar Agha for discussion here). White (2019) also suggests exploring event structural properties.
Alternatively, a hypothesis that would account for the Turkish pattern involves going back to the
idea that veridicality alternating predicates are, in fact, veridical (contrary to previous analyses).
Then, what would be puzzling (again) would not be the absence of non-veridical readings with
embedded questions, but rather their presence with embedded declaratives.
12To be entirely rigorous, one would (in the future) need to control for exhaustiveness here.
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